AEVION · Digital Signature Platform

Tamper-evident proofs,
publicly verifiable in one link.

QSign v2 signs any JSON payload under RFC 8785 canonical form with a hybrid of HMAC-SHA256 and Ed25519. Every signature is persisted, geo-anchored, revocable, and verifiable from a shareable public URL — no vendor lock-in, no trust-us.

offline
← QRightIP Bureau →PlanetKey registry
Auth
Sign in →
1. Sign payload
Payload (JSON)
✓ Valid JSON
RFC 8785 canonical · SHA-256
—
Geo anchoring
Opt-in to attach device GPS; otherwise server infers from IP
2. Verify (stateless)

Re-canonicalizes the payload server-side and recomputes both signatures. No DB lookup. For DB-backed verify + revocation check, open the public URL after signing.

Payload (JSON)
HMAC kid
HMAC sig
Ed25519 kid
Ed25519 sig
Use the API
Live snippets — copy and paste. Replace $TOKEN with your bearer.
# 1. health
curl -s https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/health | jq

# 2. sign (idempotent)
curl -s -X POST https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/sign \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Idempotency-Key: order-2026-04-28-001" \
  -d '{"payload":{"artifact":"invoice-001","amount":1500.00,"currency":"USD"}}' | jq

# 3. public verify (no auth)
curl -s https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/<signature-id>/public | jq

# 4. PDF stamp
curl -sL "https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/<signature-id>/pdf?download=1" \
  -o signed-<signatu.pdf

# 5. recent activity
curl -s https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/audit?limit=20 \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq

# 6. Prometheus metrics scrape
curl -s https://aevion-production-a70c.up.railway.app/api/qsign/v2/metrics
How QSign v2 works
  1. Your payload is canonicalized per RFC 8785 (JCS) — keys sorted, no whitespace, deterministic across clients.
  2. SHA-256 of the canonical form is signed with two independent keys: HMAC-SHA256 (shared secret) and Ed25519 (public verifiable).
  3. The signature row is persisted with issuer, geo, and key IDs. A shareable public URL verifies it without secrets.
  4. Keys rotate with an overlap window — retired keys remain valid for verifying historical signatures forever.
  5. Any signature can be revoked by its issuer (or admin). Revoked rows stay cryptographically valid but report valid=false.